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ABSTRACT 
This article proposes three arguments concerning the constitutional innovations offered by 
Cicero in the De legibus. First, these innovations are much broader and deeper than 
commonly appreciated, none more so than the very attempt at a prescriptive written 
constitution for Rome. Second, Cicero’s amendments to traditional Roman practice follow 
a consistent set of four principles, principles encapsulated in his metaphor of the republic 
as a painting in need of fresh colors. Finally, the reframed institutions within the De 
legibus reveal Cicero to be neither the reflexive optimate his critics lament, nor the far-
seeing political diagnostician he considered himself. The senate, for all its faults, remains 
the sole center of gravity in his constitutional system, and the legitimate grievances of 
Rome’s citizen majority remain unrecognized and unaddressed. Though a failure on its 
own terms, the De legibus represents antiquity’s last major attempt at original political 
thought, and an essential if unrecognized bridge to the modern idea of a constitution. 
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“Suppose that some one had a mind to 
paint a figure in the most beautiful 
manner, in the hope that his work 
instead of losing would always improve 
as time went on—do you not see that 
being a mortal, unless he leaves some 
one to succeed him who will correct the 
flaws which time may introduce, and be 
able to add what is left imperfect 
through the defect of the artist, and 
who will further brighten up and 
improve the picture, all his great labour 
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will last but a short time?”1  – Plato, 
Laws 769c.  
 
“But though the republic, when it came 
to us, was like a beautiful painting 
whose colors, however, were already 
fading with age, our own time has not 
only neglected to freshen it by renewing 
the original colors, but has not even 
taken the trouble to preserve its 
configuration and, so to speak, its 
general outlines”2 – Cicero, De republica 
5.1.2. 
 
 
In late republican Rome, to be novus was to be suspect. In political debate, novi was an 
epithet used to rebuke any departure, real or perceived, from the mos maiorum3. Likewise, 
the political ascendance of a novus homo – a man lacking ancestors of consular status – was 
an extremely rare event, Cicero being the first such novus to win the consulship in thirty 
years. Cicero was in fact a novus among novi, having risen not through military valor, as 
had his townsman Gaius Marius, but through his sharp legal mind and sharper tongue. In 
a political culture so centered upon famous bloodlines and martial glory, Cicero was 
arguably the most politically vulnerable Roman statesman of his generation, lacking 
either legions or a family network to buttress his position 4 . Whether from this 
vulnerability or from conviction, Cicero’s speeches show a consistent attention to 
                                                        
1 ‘εἴ ποτέ τις ἐπινοήσειε γράψαι τε ὡς κάλλιστον ζῷον καὶ τοῦτ᾽ αὖ μηδέποτε ἐπὶ φαυλότερον 
ἀλλ᾽ ἐπὶ τὸ βέλτιον ἴσχειν τοῦ ἐπιόντος ἀεὶ χρόνου, συννοεῖς ὅτι θνητὸς ὤν, εἰ μή τινα 
καταλείψει διάδοχον τοῦ ἐπανορθοῦν τε, ἐάν τι σφάλληται τὸ ζῷον ὑπὸ χρόνων, καὶ τὸ 
παραλειφθὲν ὑπὸ τῆς ἀσθενείας τῆς ἑαυτοῦ πρὸς τὴν τέχνην οἷός τε εἰς τὸ πρόσθεν ἔσται 
φαιδρύνων ποιεῖν ἐπιδιδόναι, σμικρόν τινα χρόνον αὐτῷ πόνος παραμενεῖ πάμπολυς;’ 
2  Nostra vero aetas cum rem publicam sicut picturam accepisset egregiam, sed iam 
evanescentem vetustate, non modo eam coloribus eisdem, quibus fuerat, renovare neglexit, 
sed ne id quidem curavit, ut formam saltem eius et extrema tamquam liniamenta servaret. 
3 See, e.g., De Lege Manilia 20.59 (“But I am told, ‘Let no innovation [novi] be made 
contrary to usage and the principles of our forefathers’”). See H.G. Hodge (ed. By), De 
Lege Manilia, in Cicero: Orations Vol. IX, Loeb Classical Library, Cambridge, MA, 
Harvard University Press; cf. Sallust, Conspiracy of Catiline 37 (ed. By J.S. Watson, New 
York and London, Harper & Brothers, 1899). 
 See also E. Rawson, Cicero: A Portrait, London, Bristol Classical Press, 1975: 154. 
4 Cf. Sallust, Conspiracy of Catiline 23: “For before this period, most of the nobility were 
moved with jealousy, and thought the consulship in some degree sullied, if a man of no 
family, however meritorious, obtained it”. See also Rawson, Cicero: A Portrait, cit.: 58-59, 
on electoral attacks made against Cicero for his lack of nobility. 
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lambasting his adversaries for proposals or practices he deemed to be nova5. For Cicero, 
the remedy to any political problem was patent in the mos maiorum, the virtues and 
practices of the republic’s glorious past. And yet, in his fragmentary and unpublished De 
legibus, what James Zetzel has called “one of the most neglected of Cicero’s works”6, 
Cicero proposes a startling array of constitutional nova: a semi-secret ballot law, new 
powers for censors, a directly elected senate, and new sanctions against political violence, 
to name but a few. Could one of Rome’s most renowned conservatives have also been its 
most constitutionally inventive?  
This article proposes three arguments concerning Cicero’s constitutional innovations. 
First, these innovations are much broader and deeper than commonly appreciated, none 
more so than the very attempt at a prescriptive written constitution for Rome. Second, 
Cicero’s amendments to existing Roman practice follow a consistent set of four principles, 
principles encapsulated in his metaphor of the republic as a painting in need of fresh colors. 
Finally, the De legibus reveals Cicero to be neither the reflexive optimate his critics lament, 
nor the far-seeing political diagnostician he considered himself. The senate, for all its faults, 
remains the sole center of gravity in his constitutional system; even for a statesman as 
ingenious as Rome ever produced, the legitimate grievances of Rome’s citizen majority, 
and the centrality of these grievances to Rome’s constitutional crisis, were beyond Cicero’s 
interest or understanding.   
 
 
1. Why Write a Constitution for Rome? 
 
In the second book of the De legibus, Cicero frames his purpose in the 
following manner: 
 
M. Do not you think, then, since Scipio in my former work on the 
Republic offered a convincing proof that our early State was the best 
[optumam] in the world, that we must provide that ideal State [optumae rei 
publicae] with laws which are in harmony with its character?’ 
 
Q. Certainly I think so. 
 
M. Then you must expect such laws as will establish [contineant] that 
best type of State. And if I chance to propose any provisions to-day which do 
not exist now and never have existed in our State, they will nevertheless be 
                                                        
5 See, e.g., De Lege Agraria 2.10.26; In Verres 1.18.55; In Verres 2.3.61.142; De Domo Sua 
44.115. 
6 J.E.G. Zetzel, “Review: A.R. Dyck’s A Commentary on Cicero, De legibus”, The Classical 
Review 55(2005), 111-113: 111. 
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found for the most part among the customs of our ancestors, which used to 
have the binding force of law7 (De legibus 2.10.23). 
 
From a literary point of view, the logic is straightforward enough: a work 
situating the optimum status rei publicae in Rome’s past leads naturally to a 
consideration of its laws for the present and future. Cicero’s intellectual 
inspiration for such a project is equally clear: in the first book, Atticus 
remarks,  
 
[S]ince you have already written a treatise on the constitution of the 
ideal State [de optimo rei publicae statu], you should also write one on its laws. 
For I note that this was done by your beloved Plato, whom you admire […] 
above all others (De legibus 1.5.15). 
 
Putting aside for the moment the myriad differences between Plato’s pair 
and Cicero’s, the De legibus represents a project that, as far as we know, had 
never been attempted in Rome’s history: a prescriptive written constitution 
for the republic. The Romans of Cicero’s generation were, of course, no 
strangers to written law. From the adoption of the Twelve Tables in the mid-
fifth century, written statutes had provided the basis for resolving a wide 
range of disputes between private citizens8 . And from at least the early 
second century, written handbooks were produced to assist magistrates with 
the performance of their increasingly complex duties, usefully compiling 
precedents but having no formal power in themselves9. In more than four 
                                                        
7  Unless otherwise noted, all translations of De republica and De legibus are those of 
Clinton Keyes in the Loeb Classical Library edition (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 
1928). 
8 See A. Lintott, The Constitution of the Roman Republic, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 
1999: 3-8. Lintott notes that “it is unlikely that the majority of the Roman people had the 
capacity to read, still less to understand legal texts. Nevertheless, men with skill in legal 
language could have understood them and told the others, and those in public office were 
obliged to read either the public copies on bronze or those in the treasury”. Cf. J.A. Crook, 
Law and Life of Rome, 90 BC – AD 212, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1967: 19-30.  
9 See A.R. Dyck, A Commentary on Cicero, De legibus, Ann Arbor, University of Michigan 
Press, 2004: 4 concerning, e.g., the magistratuum libri of C. Sempronius Tuditanus (cos. 
129) and the de Potestatibus of M. Junius Gracchanus, cited by Cicero at De legibus 3.49. 
See also Lintott, The Constitution of the Roman Republic, cit.: 4 on written commentaries 
that recorded or explained constitutional practice. Lintott concludes that a wide variety 
of rules governing Rome’s magistrates were “written down but did not derive their 
authority from the writing in which they were recorded”. 
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centuries of the republic’s history, however, at no point did an individual or 
group of Roman statesmen establish a comprehensive written framework for 
Rome’s political institutions10.  
Though educated Romans were no doubt aware of the prescriptive 
constitutions of Lycurgus or Solon that had been fundamental to the success 
of their states, the historical record down to 54 BCE reveals no Roman 
attempt to follow their lead. Roman politics operated on consensus, and more 
specifically on a common understanding among Rome’s leaders of the rules 
and practices constituting the mos maiorum. These rules, in turn, were 
legitimized not through public referendum but by the monumental success of 
Rome’s armies and its rapidly expanding empire. In these victories the 
wisdom of the ancestors was manifest; Cicero distinguished Rome from its 
Greek counterparts by declaring, “Our own commonwealth was based upon 
the genius, not of one man, but of many”11 (De republica 2.1.2). 
By the year 54, however, the republic’s unwritten consensus lay in 
tatters. Through the second century, an astonishing inflow of wealth to 
Rome had created economic and social tensions that Rome’s political 
institutions could no longer mediate, and their failure in the Gracchan crisis 
of 133-32 inaugurated eighty years of civil violence 12 . Competing 
interpretations of the mos maiorum were so deep and ongoing that they took 
on the aspect of rival clans – optimate and popularis – in fervent, often lethal, 
competition for the loyalty of Rome’s leading men and their networks of 
clientes. Once complementary authorities in the republican system, the 
tribunate and senate locked themselves in a dysfunctional stalemate. Purges 
                                                        
10 See Lintott, The Constitution of the Roman Republic, cit.: 208-13 on successive attempts 
by the Gracchi, Saturninus, Sulla, and Clodius to readjust the balance of Rome’s 
constitution. If any of these attempts at reform included a proposal for a single code or set 
of laws which would encompass all of Rome’s major civic institutions, history has not 
preserved it.   
11 Nostra autem res publica non unius esset ingenio, sed multorum. See Rawson, Cicero: A 
Portrait, cit.: 150 on how Rome’s mixed constitution differed, for both contemporary and 
subsequent observers, from its Greek counterparts. 
12 See J.E.G. Zetzel (ed. By), Cicero: On the Commonwealth and On the Laws, Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 1999: xii. The beginning of Rome’s civil wars were thus due 
in an important sense to conflicting interpretations of what the unwritten mos allowed: T. 
Gracchus’ circumvention of the senate, the impeachment of a fellow tribune, and standing 
for a second term were all, to one group of Romans, totally in keeping with Roman values 
and precedents. To another group, they represented such an egregious violation of those 
precedents that the bloody massacre of Gracchus and his followers was both necessary and 
legally justified. 
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and proscriptions replaced elections as the determinants of Rome’s political 
agenda. Such elections that remained were increasingly marred by bribery, 
and popular assemblies became arenas of gang warfare13. Rome’s empire was 
secure, but its unwritten constitution had failed. 
At this moment of constitutional emergency, Cicero decided to propose 
something Rome had never had before: a prescriptive written constitution. 
The originality and impact of this decision has, bewilderingly, received next 
to no attention from modern scholars. As early as 1921, describing the three 
tenets of modern constitutionalism, Clinton Keyes concluded that “the 
collection of ‘laws’ in De legibus III is the only ancient document which seem 
to correspond to the modern idea of a constitution […] Whether he fully 
realized it or not, he actually seems to have written the first constitution of 
this kind in existence”14. Since this well-supported endorsement made by a 
prominent Ciceronian nearly a century ago, commentary on the De legibus 
has been either silent or dismissive on this point15. 
Why has Cicero’s daring innovation been so roundly overlooked? At least 
three reasons present themselves. The first is textual: as far as we are aware, 
the De legibus remained incomplete and unpublished at Cicero’s death. Its 
extant form is fragmentary and occasionally obscure; unsurprisingly, 
scholarly attention to the De legibus has paled in comparison with Cicero’s 
other works. The second is formal: the notion that a law code situated in a 
literary dialogue could have any serious political purpose is simply too 
strange for some modern observers to allow 16 . The final is lexical: in a 
                                                        
13 See, e.g., Crook, Law and Life of Rome, cit.: 265: “[B]y Cicero’s day politics was a jungle; 
on one side the upper class had political pressure-groups for the purpose of ‘managing’ 
elections […] and on the other side there arose the real ‘mob,’ bands of thugs, free and 
slave, operating to intimidate, to break up elections and so on”. 
14 C.W. Keyes, “Original Elements in Cicero’s Ideal Constitution”, American Journal of 
Philology 42(1921), 309-323: 309, 312. 
15 Cf. Zetzel, “Review: A.R. Dyck’s A Commentary on Cicero, De legibus”, cit.: 111; Dyck, 
A Commentary on Cicero, De legibus, cit.: 1. 
16 See Rawson’s (E. Rawson, “The Interpretation of Cicero’s De legibus”, Aufstieg und 
Niedergang Der Römischen Welt I.4(1973): 334-56, reprinted in E. Rawson (ed.), Roman 
Culture and Society, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1991: 125-48) pat dismissal at 142: 
“Cicero’s laws are too compressed (and too literary) to be compared with the codifications 
planned by Pompey […] and Caesar.” On why Cicero may have considered compression 
useful for Roman law given its state of pettifogging metastasis, see De legibus 1.4.12-1.6.18. 
(To borrow a modern example, “compressing” a constitution to six pages did not appear 
to have troubled America’s founding fathers.) Cicero’s use of the dialogue form to further 
his constitutional project is discussed in Sections A and B, infra. Even Rawson admits, 
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tradition dating at least as far as Clinton Keyes’ 1928 Loeb edition, the term 
optimus status rei publicae has been translated as “ideal republic,” a term to 
which modern English adds the connotations of “transcendent,” “utopian,” 
even “imaginary” 17 . Never mind that Cicero had already used the term 
optimus in the De republica to refer to the actual Rome of history, or that 
optimus is just the superlative form of bonus: if the De legibus was merely an 
unfinished sketch of an imaginary Rome, modern scholars could feel justified 
in overlooking it. 
There are at least three reasons why the De legibus should be taken 
seriously as a political proposal, and thus as a watershed moment in the 
history of political thought. The first is found in the quote from Book III 
above:  
 
If I chance to propose any provisions to-day which do not exist now and 
never have existed in our State, they will nevertheless be found for the most 
part among the customs of our ancestors, which used to have the binding 
force of law [tum ut lex valebat] (De legibus 2.10.23).  
 
The imperfect tense of valebat is key; if the unwritten mos maiores once 
sufficed to make citizens obey common rules, they no longer do. By 
implication, some new approach is needed for the mos maiorum to exert the 
same binding force on Rome’s current and future citizens; Cicero’s written 
law code, inspired by Greek political thought and ancestral Roman tradition, 
is that new approach18.  
                                                                                                                                                                     
however, that De legibus represents “our best evidence for the reforms that he would have 
liked to see introduced at Rome” (Rawson, Cicero: A Portrait, cit: 154). 
17 As an example, consider the related but distinct meanings of the English terms “optimal 
solution” and “ideal solution”. The English mistranslation of optimus as “ideal” has 
touched even the highest rungs of Ciceronian scholarship; see, e.g. Rawson, “The 
Interpretation of Cicero’s De legibus”, cit.: 143 and Zetzel (Zetzel [ed. By], Cicero: On the 
Commonwealth and On the Laws, cit.: xxiii). Powell (J.G.F. Powell, “Were Cicero’s Laws 
the Laws of Cicero’s Republic?”, Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies 45(2001): 17-
39) would seem to have put the matter definitively to rest. See also L. Strauss, What is 
Political Philosophy? Westport, CT, Greenwood Press, 1973: 84-85 on “the natural 
tendency” of antique political controversy “to express itself in universal terms”. 
18  See Zetzel (ed. By), Cicero: On the Commonwealth and On the Laws, cit.: xi, 
characterizing Cicero’s dialogues as “an attempt to transpose Greek ideas about public life 
into a Roman context and to provide a more rigorous philosophical model for Roman 
public behavior and institutions.” An important parallel to the Twelve Tables is also 
worth noting: Prior to 451 BCE, legal disputes among private citizens were settled by 
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Secondly, Cicero displays a keen desire to repair what is broken in 
Rome’s civil law tradition. Early in Book I, Atticus asks Marcus why he 
doesn’t use his free time to compose a treatise on the civil law, Marcus 
answers as follows: “I believe that there have been most eminent men in our 
State whose customary function it was to interpret the law to the people and 
answer questions in regard to it, but that these men, though they have made 
great claims, have spent their time on unimportant details. What subject 
indeed is so vast as the law of the State [ius civitatis]? But what so trivial as 
the task of those who give legal advice?” (De legibus 1.4.14) As a Roman 
statesman, perhaps the first, whose ascendance in politics was due entirely to 
success in the courts, Cicero’s opinion on the state of Roman law should be 
weighed heavier than most19. If we take him at his word20, Cicero saw a legal 
community bogged down in trifles, and believed he could clarify and 
harmonize the tradition which had formed him and thrust him to prominence.  
A third reason to take the De legibus seriously relates to Cicero’s political 
position in the late 50s. With the Conference of Luca renewing the effective 
hegemony of the First Triumvirate, Cicero found himself shut out of high-
level politics at Rome. The internal evidence of the De legibus is that during 
this period of involuntary otium, the wounds of his recent political battles – 
most notably with Clodius – remained fresh. The provisions on capital 
punishment for disobeying augurs, holding presiding magistrates responsible 
for vis, outlawing privilegia, and punishing violations of “religious 
obligations,” are all explicitly or implicitly responses to Clodius’ popularis 
campaign (Even Cicero’s sanction of capital punishment for incest at 2.9.22 
could be seen as a slap at Clodius, whose rumored affair with his sister Clodia 
                                                                                                                                                                     
unwritten tradition or personal authority; Cf. Crook, Law and Life of Rome, cit.: 28. When 
the social tensions between patrician and plebeian broke the consensus necessary for these 
methods to continue, a new approach – the codification of unwritten legal customs into a 
written code – was adopted. There is no reason to think that, steeped in the Roman legal 
tradition as he was, that this precedent failed to attract Cicero’s attention; cf. Zetzel (ed. 
By), Cicero: On the Commonwealth and On the Laws, cit.: xxiv. 
19  Among the great legal experts Cicero cites – M. Scaevola, L. Crassus, M. Junius 
Gracchanus – all were from well-established patrician families. 
20 I am aware of the risks in ascribing the opinions of the character “Marcus” to Cicero 
himself, just as the pronouncements of the literary “Atticus” and “Quintus” do not 
necessarily reflect those of their historical namesakes. Where evidence from external 
sources suggests a gap between those of the real Cicero and those of “Marcus,” I will note a 
possible distinction; no such gap is evident concerning the real Cicero’s opinion about civil 
law.  
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was a Ciceronian leitmotif). As tribune, Clodius had enacted a series of laws 
that shifted the balance of power away from optimate-controlled institutions; 
writing De legibus allowed Cicero an opportunity to advance in print the 
political goals he could not advance in person21. To assert that the law code in 
the De legibus was a serious proposal is not to imply, of course, that Cicero 
had a specific plan to see his law code adopted and implemented. But in a 
generation that had seen several attempts to “re-found” Roman institutions 
– beginning with Sulla, continuing through Clodius and Caesar and achieving 
fruition in Cicero’s would-be protégé Octavian – a project of the De legibus’s 
political boldness was not unique, even if its intellectual content was. 
The decision to write a constitution for Rome led the ex-consul into 
uncharted and uncomfortable territory. As a longtime leader of optimate 
resistance to popularis reforms, he evidences discomfort with proposing novi 
on his own behalf22. At times, he claims to be faithfully and exclusively 
codifying the mos maiorum, with slight, almost bashful caveats23. At times, 
he proudly presents new laws, such as those relating to the censorship, “that 
have never been in use among us, but are necessary for the public interest” 
(De legibus 3.20.46). And at times, as with the death penalty for disobeying 
augurs, he hides his innovation entirely, claiming his law “already to be 
found in the customs and laws of our State” (De legibus 3.19.43). As a 
political conservative embarking on a legal and philosophical project with no 
precedent at Rome, Cicero faced daunting questions: How closely would he 
hew to existing Roman practice? What boundaries and principles would 
                                                        
21 Cf. J.-M. David,  La République romaine de la deuxième guerre punique à la bataille 
d’Actium (218-31): Crise d’une aristocratie. Paris, Ed. du Seuil, 2000: 223: “[Cicéron] 
tentais alors de faire admettre dans l’opinion des principes qu’il ne pouvait plus transcrire 
lui-même dans l’action civique et de regagner par le magistère intellectuel la perte de 
prestige et d’autorité qu’entraînait sa subordination aux décisions des triumvirs.” 
22 For prior instances where Cicero parried accusations that he had endorsed novi, see In 
Verres 1.18.55, where he employs the novel tactic of grouping his witnesses together (but 
denies this is a break from precedent), and De lege Manilia 20.59, where he defends 
Pompey’s new powers by arguing, “[O]ur forefathers always bowed to precedent in peace 
but to expediency in war, always meeting fresh emergencies with fresh developments of 
policy [ad novos casus temporum novorum consiliorum rationes]”. Cicero would have had 
little difficulty employing a version of the latter argument to cover his constitutional 
innovations – the republic being, in a larger sense, at war with itself.  
23 See De legibus 2.10.23, “they will nevertheless be found for the most part [fere] among 
the customs of our ancestors”; De legibus 3.5.12, “I had no innovations, or at least only a 
few [sane non multum], which I thought ought to be introduced into the constitution”. 
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guide his departures? To what extent could he frame the task of 
constitutional innovation as one of preservation or restoration?  
Though we will never know how Cicero answered these questions for 
himself, he offers a significant clue in the use of a vivid and curious political 
metaphor. 
 
 
2. Cicero’s Painted Republic 
 
Contemporary interpretations of the De legibus have often centered upon its 
appropriations and departures from the divinum illum virum, Plato (De 
legibus 3.1.1). Though he likely misread the Laws as a continuation or 
completion of the Republic24, Cicero borrows from the former work on a 
number of significant points, including the setting (a bucolic walk on a 
summer day), the time (significantly later than the first of the two dialogues), 
the phasing out of a named protagonist from the first dialogue (Socrates, 
Scipio),25 and the number of interlocutors (three). 
One of the most revealing – and, to my knowledge, heretofore 
unexamined – correspondences between the two pairs of dialogues is the 
metaphor of the ideal constitution as a painting, found in Book VI of the 
Laws and Book V of the De republica. Plato’s “Athenian”, joking that the 
painters he knows “never cease touching up their works,” argues that in a 
similar fashion a legislator, being mortal and imperfect, should leave “some 
one to succeed him who will correct the flaws which time may introduce, and 
be able to add what is left imperfect through the defect of the artist, and who 
will further brighten up and improve the picture” (769c). Observing that as 
he and his fellows in the dialogue are old men, and that the “guardians of the 
law” are young in comparison, the Athenian concludes that his trio must 
“endeavour to make them not only guardians of the law but legislators 
themselves, as far as this is possible” (770a). 
Cicero adopts Plato’s image of the optimal constitution as a painting in 
need of maintenance, but alters it in several illuminating points. Plato’s 
painted constitution is explicitly the product of a single mind, and requires 
                                                        
24 Cf. Rawson, Cicero: A Portrait, cit: 153. 
25 Interpreters of the Laws from Aristotle to the present have identified “the Athenian” as 
embodying Socrates in some fashion; see, e.g., L. Strauss, The Argument and the Action of 
Plato's Laws. Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1975: 1-2. Nevertheless, the shift in 
named characters remains a common point between Plato’s and Cicero’s dialogues. 
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improvement both because of the “defect of the artist” and of “the flaws 
which time may introduce”. Cicero gives Plato’s metaphor a half turn; the 
Roman painting is viewed not from the point of view of its imperfect and 
singular creator, but rather from that of the current generation “receiving” it 
as a bequest from generations past. This difference of perspective reveals how 
Cicero may have viewed himself differently from his philosophical hero: 
where Plato had sought to put an optimal state on its feet, Cicero seeks 
instead to keep his own running. As argued above, the constitution of the De 
legibus can thus be more usefully interpreted not an “ideal Rome” created for 
theoretical or literary ends, but as a practical (if ultimately unfinished) 
blueprint for restoring, with creative adjustments, the optimal Rome that its 
maiores had built. 
In a second contrast with Plato, Cicero’s metaphor lacks any suggestion 
of a flaw or defect in Rome’s constitution which requires correction. Where a 
single Platonic artist may err, the collective product of Rome’s maiores is a 
constitution of optimu statu – that is, if not the “ideal” constitution in a 
transcendent or eternal sense, the best order that human beings could 
produce in our material world. Cicero’s painted constitution is thus not 
“corrected” (epanorthoun) but preserved (servaret) and renewed (renovare). 
The painting metaphor also suggests a far more nuanced view of Cicero’s 
political conservatism than his critics generally grant him. The preservation 
of Rome’s constitution is decidedly not achieved through passive admiration 
or merely protecting it from meddling popularis hands; rather, constitutional 
preservation is an active and ongoing process of renewal, demanding fresh 
ranks of enlightened and virtuous statesmen. Cicero laments that his 
generation has failed in its duty to “refresh the colours” of the Roman 
constitution, to “preserve its configuration” (forma) and “general outlines” 
(extrema lineamenta).  
How does Cicero’s metaphor of the republic as painting help us 
understand the purpose and content of De legibus’s written Roman 
constitution? The metaphor suggests four linked principles that may have 
guided Cicero’s constitutionalism. First, in agreement with Plato’s Laws 
(though not with his Republic), an optimal constitution for Cicero is not a 
legal arrangement frozen in place. Because time will naturally cause the 
“fading” of a constitution, each generation of statesmen has a role to play in 
preserving it. Second, also as in Plato, the maintenance of a constitution is 
not a passive or prophylactic process but an active and creative one – a 
painting must be directly handled in order to “refresh” it. Third, this 
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handling requires a special expertise or technē earned by the painter, and 
embodied for Cicero in the rational reflection and seasoned prudence of 
statesmen. Finally, Cicero adds a fascinating detail to Plato’s metaphor in 
the distinction made between the “colours” of a constitution and its 
“configuration” and “outlines”. What could he have meant by this 
distinction? A few lines later he states directly that “the loss of our customs is 
due to our lack of men” and concludes that  
 
it is through our own faults […] that we retain only the form of the 
commonwealth, but have long since lost its substance26 (De republica 5.1.2). 
 
Relating this comment back to the image of the painting, I propose that 
by a failure to “refresh the colors” (coloribus […] renovare) of the state, Cicero 
has in mind the personal failure of Rome’s leading men to follow the moral 
example of their ancestors, and that by “general outlines” (extrema 
liniamenta), he means the institutional arrangements that remain in words 
(verbo) long after their animating spirit has faded. The complementarity of 
institutional authority and individual virtue is not original to Cicero, but his 
treatment of the theme produces constitutional ideas of startling 
inventiveness. 
 
 
3. The Constitution of the De legibus 
 
In the second and third books of the De legibus, the character Marcus plays 
the role of lawgiver, pronouncing laws related to religious and political 
institutions, respectively27. Following the recitation of his code, Marcus leads 
a group discussion of some of the code’s more critical and controversial 
provisions. In both books, the discussion section begins with Quintus 
declaring approvingly that Marcus’s laws resemble, but are not identical to, 
past or existing Roman practice (De legibus 2.10.23; 3.5.12). Among the 
                                                        
26 Nostris enim vitiis, non casu aliquo, rem publicam verbo retinemus, re ipsa vero iam pridem 
amisimus.  
27 An intriguing consequence of Cicero’s choice of the dialogue form is that while the 
author Cicero is writing the constitution, the protagonist Marcus is of course speaking it. 
Having evidently read the Phaedrus (Atticus alludes to it by name at 2.3.6), Cicero 
implicitly engages Plato’s debate over the priority of the written or spoken word, ensuring 
that his new law code is both. 
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innovations Cicero offers in the realm of politics are a tribunate accountable 
for political violence, a semi-secret ballot, an altered cursus honorum, an 
expanded censorship, new rights of judicial appeal, and a directly elected 
senate with stronger legislative powers. The details of these constitutional 
innovations will now be taken up in turn.  
 
A. The Tribunate 
 
From an optimate perspective, Cicero’s inclusion of the tribunate in its pre-
Sullan form – or as he puts it, quae est in re publica nostra (“as it is in our 
state”) – would have been one of his constitution’s most surprising features. 
For three generations the tribunate had been a notorious springboard of 
popularis politicians, suppressed by Sulla, partially reinstated by Pompey, 
and recently held by Cicero’s bitter enemy Clodius. Furthermore, in Book I 
the character Marcus denigrates legal enactments in which the populace 
“decrees whatever it wishes” (scripta sancit quod vult), noting that these are 
only what “the crowd” calls law (ut vulgus appellat), and should not be 
confused with summa lex, the supreme law of Nature that will guide Cicero’s 
own laws 28 . Nevertheless, these laws ultimately provide for ten tribunes 
“whose persons shall be inviolable” and whose resolutions, when ratified by 
the plebeian assembly, “shall be binding” (ratum esto). What is Cicero 
thinking here?  
The painting metaphor helps us make sense of Cicero’s tribunate in at 
least three ways. First, echoing the distinction between the painting’s lines 
and its colors, in his defense of the tribunate Cicero draws a sharp line 
between his castigation of individual tribunes and his opinion of the office 
itself. The positive impact of the institution – which helps ensure “the 
senatorial order is not subject to envy, and the common people make no 
desperate struggles for their rights” (De legibus 3.10.25) – outweighs the 
negative impact of any individual tribune. Secondly, Quintus argues that the 
tribunate was “a mischievous thing […] begotten in the midst of dissension” 
(De legibus 3.8.19). Remember that for Cicero, unlike Plato, there are no 
                                                        
28 Marcus goes as far as to accept Quintus’ assertion that three popularis laws related to 
agrarian reform and grain distribution were not really laws at all (leges nullas putas), 
though he adds the caveat that they were quickly and decisively repealed. (De legibus 
2.6.13-14) In this exchange and in the debate over the tribunate and ballot laws, Cicero 
allows Quintus to voice the “optimate fundamentalist” position that the character Marcus 
engages sympathetically while trying to guide it toward more conciliatory ground. 
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defects to be corrected in the constitution of the maiores; its “general 
configurations” (extrema liniamenta) are to be preserved, and removing the 
tribunate would amount to a major alteration of these liniamenta. On the 
contrary, Cicero insists, the tribunate testifies to the sapientia of the maiores, 
who devised it as a compromise (temperamentum) that would mollify the 
people’s desire for liberty while keeping them under the guidance of their 
betters (De legibus 3.10.24-25). The tribunate is therefore not the enemy of 
the boni, but rather an instrument to keep an unruly populus under control29.  
Finally, the debate between Quintus and Marcus over the tribunate gives 
Cicero his best chance to model the technē of statesmanship necessary to care 
for a painted republic. The ultimate test of a constitution is its ability to 
mediate political conflict without recourse to violence; the unwritten Roman 
constitution began failing this test with the murder of T. Gracchus in 132, 
and was failing it with greater frequency and blatancy by the late 50s. In the 
De legibus, Cicero’s veneration of reasoned discourse is matched only by his 
horror of political violence, and his section on the tribunate allows the 
expression of each. First, Cicero emphasizes that tribunes can be held 
responsible for violence in a way that mobs cannot, and that they can calm 
the violent impulses of the populus as well as inflame them (De legibus 
3.10.23-24). In a more positive vein, Cicero uses the dialogue form to model 
how patriotic statesmen can disagree without being disagreeable. He lets 
“Quintus” present an impassioned and detailed argument against the 
tribunate, and when “Marcus” fails to convince Quintus and Atticus, he 
draws further attention to the dialogue form by joking that, by the rules of 
                                                        
29 Cicero may additionally be offering a counterpoint to Polybius’s portrayal of Rome’s 
institutional balance. Polybius observes, after treating the consulship, senate, and popular 
assemblies in turn, that “whenever one of the three elements swells in importance […] the 
designs of anyone can be blocked or impeded by the rest, with the result that none will 
unduly dominate the others or treat them with contempt. Thus the whole situation 
remains in equilibrium since any aggressive impulse is checked, and each estate is 
apprehensive from the outset of censure from the others” (Hist. 6.18). In this passage, the 
ur-text for the modern theory of checks and balances, Polybius presents Rome’s 
constitution as a mechanism for extending and rationalizing the conflicts inherent in 
Roman society. For Cicero, by contrast, Rome’s constitutional bodies should not manage 
and channel conflict but reduce it; concordia, not equipoise, is Cicero’s objective. See also 
De republica 2.16.30, where Cicero responds forcefully to Polybius’s claim that the Roman 
constitution had evolved as a series of chance adaptations to adversity: “And you will 
learn that the Roman People has grown great, not by chance, but by good counsel and 
discipline, though to be sure fortune has favoured us also”. 
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the genre, the other characters in the dialogue are supposed to agree with him 
(De legibus 3.11.26).  
The utility of the dialogue form is therefore not to show how optimates 
and populares, employing reason and dialogue, can come to a quick and easy 
agreement. Reasoned, collegial, non-violent discussion of sensitive political 
questions is for Cicero an end in itself, independent of the debate’s outcome. 
He underscores this by finishing the debate with a kind of Socratic aporia, 
with both sides agreeing to disagree (De legibus 3.11.26). On a superficial level, 
the debate over the tribunate has failed, but Cicero may have used this 
device for two subtler purposes. First, the characters Marcus and Quintus are 
the spokesmen not only for two specific political positions, but also for the 
competing political imperatives to do what is necessary (necessarium) versus 
what is best (optimum). Despite the supposedly absolutist demands of the ius 
natura, Cicero via Marcus provides a passionate defense for the art of 
compromise, which he credits to the maiores themselves (De legibus 3.10.24). 
The tension between optimum and necessarium, essential and perhaps 
unresolvable, is modeled for future Roman statesmen in the polite but firm 
disagreement of the two brothers30. The second message reflects the more 
profound crisis of current Roman politics: simply agreeing to disagree, 
without drawing swords or calling up legions, is precisely what Roman 
politicians had failed to do in Cicero’s lifetime 31 . The technē of peaceful 
political deliberation is one Rome has lost, and the tribunate debate offers 
Cicero the means to model this lost element of Roman statesmanship32. 
 
                                                        
30  Cf. Scipio’s observation at De republica 2.33.57 that “the essential nature of the 
commonwealth often defeats reason” (vincit ipsa rerum publicarum natura saepe rationem). 
I am grateful to Professor David Fott for guiding me to this point.  
31 As Professor Carlos Lévy poses the question, “la question qui hante Ciceron n’est-elle 
pas aussi la difficulté d’actualiser une autre forme de transcendance, celle du mos maiorum, 
dans un monde en proie à la violence née precisement de l’affrontement des egoismes?” (C. 
Lévy, Cicero Academicus: Recherches sur les Académiques et sur la Philosophie Cicéronienne, 
Rome, Ecole Française de Rome, 1992: 503). 
32  Despite his innovative use of Platonic dialogue to illustrate the virtues of Roman 
statesmen, Cicero offers no explicit theory of political deliberation in the De legibus. One 
possible difficulty is that natural law and pluralist deliberation are not natural intellectual 
bedfellows; either one believes in a single “right” answer to a political question or one does 
not. Cicero’s implication at 1.6.19 that “the crowd’s” concept of law is at odds with the 
summa lex of nature diminish the likelihood that popularis perspectives on political 
questions, even when held by senatorial peers, could be granted equal respect under a 
Ciceronian scheme. Gentlemen may disagree, in other words, but only to a point.  
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B. The Ballot 
 
Of all the provisions in Cicero’s constitution, perhaps none is more 
peculiar than his idea of how Romans should vote:  
 
When elective, judicial, and legislative acts of the people are performed 
by vote, the voting shall not be concealed from citizens of high rank, and 
shall be free to the common people33 (De legibus 3.4.10). 
 
When the three interlocutors debate this provision later in Book III, all 
sides agree on the salient political facts: Rome’s ballots had once been 
entirely open; after a series of reforms beginning in the 130s, they were now 
almost entirely secret, but riven with bribery. Our first clue that Cicero is 
attempting something new and unfamiliar lies in Atticus’s first reaction to 
the proposal:  
 
I could get no clear idea of the meaning of this law (De legibus 3.15.33).  
 
Marcus frames the question simply – should the votes of Roman citizens 
be recorded openly or secretly? – then promptly gives the floor to his brother, 
thereby allowing the proposal to be extensively critiqued before it is even 
explained.  
Quintus, defending a pure voice vote, opposes Marcus’ proposal on both 
historical and principled grounds. As a matter of history, the secret ballot 
was not the people’s creation but rather the creation of demagogues who 
sought to manipulate them34. The four laws that had been passed to extend 
closed balloting rights were the proposals of no-account or wayward 
aristocrats who later repented – or, in the case of the first law, with the 
support of Marcus’ “beloved” Scipio, who deserves blame just as Marcus will 
deserve it for his own proposal (De legibus 3.16.37). As a matter of principle, 
Quintus laments that Rome’s boni too often retreat from optimum policies 
                                                        
33 Creatio magistratuum, iudicia populi, iussa vetita quom suffragio cosciscentur, optumatibus 
nota, plebi libera sunto. 
34 “Such a law was never desired by the people when they were free, but was demanded 
only when they were tyrannized over by the powerful men in the State” (De legibus 
3.15.34). 
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because they fear popular opposition35. This argument sounds his familiar 
note of optimate fundamentalism – the populus as a wholly negative 
counterweight to good leadership – but Cicero the author is also pointing his 
readers back to the tension, discussed above, between optimum and 
necessarium: does political compromise represent a weakening of the optimus 
status rei publicae or a core virtue which serves and sustains it? 
Likewise, Marcus defends the proposal on both practical and principled 
grounds. As a matter of history, he argues that those balloting reforms which 
were “made to interfere with the buying of votes, as they usually are”, should 
be repealed not because they aimed at an unworthy target but because they 
failed to hit it.  
 
[I]f [those] laws have never actually prevented bribery, then let the 
people have their ballots as a safeguard of their liberty, but with the 
provision that these ballots are to be shown and voluntarily exhibited to any 
of our best and most eminent citizens (De legibus 3.17.39).  
 
As a question of principle, then, the people will retain the libertas they 
have become accustomed to, while the senate’s auctoritas – the only sure 
protection against electoral corruption – will be restored. 
In this openly avowed innovation, Cicero the author is once again 
applying the principles of his painted republic. First, against the complaints 
of Quintus, he has the character Marcus defend – or at least non reprehendere 
– a series of proactive measures against electoral bribery, though he insists 
that his own will succeed where they have failed. Here again a “conservative 
activism” is required to defend the institutions bequeathed by the maiores. 
Moreover, the dialogue form again allows Cicero the author to model his 
technē of discursive statesmanship: each side of the question is argued 
strenuously but politely, with the first word given graciously to his opponent 
and a defense that engages thoughtfully with its critique. But is the proposal 
itself anything more than a slapdash compromise, guaranteed to please 
neither side, or is there some deeper sense at work? 
 
                                                        
35 “[T]his is a view which, more than any other, both leads the inexperienced astray, and 
is very frequently a hindrance in public affairs; the belief, I mean, that certain measures 
are wise and good [verum et rectum], but are impracticable; that is, that the people cannot 
be opposed.” (De legibus 3.15.34)  
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Here the painting metaphor aids us in a different way, by drawing our 
attention to the text which contains its Platonic counterpart. Outlining 
Magnesia’s magistracies in Book VI of the Laws, the Athenian insists that  
 
those who are to elect should have been trained in habits of law, and be 
well educated, that they may have a right (ὀρθός) judgment, and may be 
able to select or reject men whom they approve or disapprove, as they are 
worthy of either (751d).  
 
Initially, this judgment is to be guided by the “parent” colony of the 
Cnossians, who “should take a common interest in all these matters” (754c). 
The votes are to be registered on tablets, with the name and choice of the 
voter clearly marked, and then to be exhibited in the Agora for a period not 
less than 30 days (753c). The similarities to Cicero’s proposal are striking: 
voting as a “correct” judgment, guided from above, and ready to be 
exhibited. But isn’t the exhibition of votes to the general public different 
than the exhibition of votes at the request of one’s social superiors – in short, 
isn’t Plato’s voting method far more egalitarian? Plato anticipates this kind 
of question:  
 
There are two equalities which are called by the same name, but are in 
reality in many ways almost the opposite of one another.  
 
The first of these is simple mathematical equality, and the second “the 
better and higher kind”, is described thus: 
 
It gives to the greater more, and to the inferior less and in proportion to 
the nature of each; and above all, greater honour always to the greater virtue, 
and to the less less; and to either in proportion to their respective measure of 
virtue and education (757c). 
 
With this defense of proportional equality, the civic hierarchies which 
distinguished republican Rome from democratic Athens are justified by 
Athens’ greatest philosopher36. As Cicero would crystallize it in the sixth 
book (a coincidence?) of the De republica,  
                                                        
36 Cf. Rawson, Cicero: A Portrait, cit: 151: “To [Cicero], as to Plato, justice is involved in 
the preservation of proper ranks and hierarchies, though there is a sympathetic insistence 
on the equality of all citizens before the law”. 
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citizens ought to be weighed rather than counted (De republica 6.1.1).  
 
Still, Cicero departs from Plato significantly on his characterization of 
the “guidance from above” which voters require. Unlike Plato, for whom 
such guidance was a temporary measure allowing citizens time to be educated 
in the ways of the new city, Cicero does not allow that ordinary citizens could 
ever become educated or virtuous without aristocratic guidance. One could 
even say that for Cicero, the only relevant indicator of virtue in a rank-and-
file citizen is that they vote however the boni instruct them. 
The problematic attitude of Cicero toward ordinary Roman voters is 
captured in his closing argument for the half-secret ballot:  
 
our law grants the appearance of liberty (libertatis species), preserves the 
influence of the aristocracy, and removes the causes of dispute between the 
classes (De legibus 3.17.39).  
 
In the discussion on the tribunate, the character Marcus insists that “real 
liberty, not a pretence of it, had to be given to the common people” (De 
legibus 3.10.25)37, yet with Cicero’s new ballot the res of libertas is scaled back 
to a species, a mere appearance. 
Is the libertas offered to Rome’s voters under this constitution no more 
than a sham? Such is the position of Neil Wood, who argues that Cicero’s 
code is “above all else an ingenious mechanism to maintain the dominance of 
the large noble landholders in an age of mounting popular demand for more 
liberty and a greater role in government”38. While Cicero’s condescension 
toward the common Roman voter was undeniable, I am not as ready to 
convict him of simple hypocrisy on this point. The De legibus was intended 
for an educated, politically consequential audience, most Roman citizens not 
being disposed to read philosophical dialogues that engaged Stoic natural law. 
To convince his arch-conservative brother (a character with whom many of 
Cicero’s readers would identify), the character Marcus needed to reassure him 
in terms that an optimate would accept: the boni will keep their auctoritas, 
while the populus is appeased just enough not to cause trouble. The framing 
is more reminiscent of a canny statesman closing a deal than the unwitting 
                                                        
37 …plebi re, non verbo danda libertas. 
38 N. Wood, Cicero’s Social and Political Thought, Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of 
California Press, 1988: 171. 
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confession of a populus-hating aristocrat. Nevertheless, the fact remains that 
the debate over Cicero’s ballot is not the reconciliation of two political sides, 
but of one side with the middle. Here as elsewhere, the popularis position is 
simply absent, the point of view of Rome’s citizen majority unworthy of 
serious engagement. 
 
 
C. Assemblies and Augurs 
 
Under traditional Roman practice, the augurs’ interpretations of divine will 
could have very direct political implications. With the words “alio die”, these 
officials could prevent a popular assembly such as the comitia tributa from 
conducting its business, and since many augurs were selected from patrician 
families, this power often amounted to an aristocratic veto over popular 
assemblies39. The Aelian and Fufian laws required that such observations of 
adverse omens must be respected, but Cicero’s enemy Clodius had effected 
strong limitations on these laws in the 50s40. He had also established a more 
direct form of control on assembly business in the form of armed gangs meant 
to intimidate any dissenters; unsurprisingly, violence at these assemblies had 
increased dramatically by that decade’s end41. 
At this moment of crisis, Cicero proposes two linked innovations to 
address the problem of violent and uncontrollable public assemblies. The first 
is to hold the presiding magistrate of an assembly (generally a tribune) 
personally responsible for any vis occurring during the course of business, and 
the second is to impose a penalty of death on any citizen who disobeys an 
augur’s finding (De legibus 2.21.6). Marcus describes the former law as merely 
a codification of the policy chosen by his early mentor L. Crassus, the 
“supremely wise man” who recommended G. Carbo (tr. 96) be held personally 
responsible for disorder he had instigated. The provision concerning augurs 
he claims is “already to be found in the customs and laws of our State”, 
despite the fact that no evidence exists for a penalty of capital punishment 
having been applied in such cases42. In any event, the principle linking these 
two proposals is clear:  
                                                        
39 See Polybius, Hist. 6.56.11; cf. Lintott, The Constitution of the Roman Republic, cit.: 187-
190. 
40 See Post Reditum in Senatu 5.11; De Haruspicum Responsis 27.58. 
41 See Crook, Law and Life of Rome, cit.: 265. 
42 See Dyck, A Commentary on Cicero, De legibus, cit.:15. 
A Painted Republic: the Constitutional Innovations of Cicero’s De legibus 
 
327 
 
 
Nothing is more destructive to governments, nothing is in such complete 
opposition to justice and law, nothing is less suitable for civilized men, than 
the use of violence in a State which has a fixed and definite constitution 
[composita et constituta re publica]” (De legibus 3.18.42). 
 
Against the problem of political violence, Cicero’s solution is reinforced 
control from above, though in this case from both “inside” (presiding 
tribunes) and “outside” (augurs) of the institution. 
Here too the painted republic helps us understand how and why Cicero 
chooses the innovations he does. The first step in fixing the institution of 
popular assemblies is recognizing that they have “faded”, in the loss of 
aristocratic control via augural veto and the increase in political violence – 
problems he would have seen as both concurrent and mutually reinforcing. 
To restore the assemblies to their former stability, he creates new legal 
penalties that strengthen the sanctions associated with each problem. More 
importantly, he does not redress the problem of public assemblies by 
removing any of their formal powers – this would be tantamount to removing 
a key figure from the maiores’ painting. Rather, he “preserves the outlines” 
of the institution by creating new legal incentives for the assemblies to 
function as the ancestors intended. Finally, the locus of these incentives are 
not the populus but the statesmen intended to control them; the presiding 
magistrate takes personal responsibility for the inherently unthinking crowd, 
and the augur who casts his veto is “shall be deemed a citizen of 
distinguished service”43 (De legibus 3.19.43). This is the specific content of 
Cicero’s “refreshed colors” and “general outlines” – clarified boundaries for 
institutional power, and new incentives for leaders to behave virtuously 
within them. 
 
 
 
                                                        
43 This is only one of several points in which Cicero strengthens the tools which Roman 
political actors could use to stop any legislative change from happening; see also his 
endorsement of a proto-filibuster in Roman senatorial procedure, “in which case it is a 
good thing to use up the whole day” (De legibus 3.18.40). While giving a philosophical 
statesman like himself free rein to propose constitutional changes, Cicero apparently 
wants to make further changes as difficult as possible. As he concludes, “It is better that a 
good measure should fail that that a bad one should be allowed to pass”. 
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D. The Senate 
  
In its formal powers and informal example, the senate has no rival within 
Cicero’s constitution. The changes he proposes to the institution are threefold. 
First, in what he calls “certainly a popularis measure”, Marcus’ laws ensure  
 
that no one shall enter that exalted order except by popular election, the 
censors being deprived of the right of free choice (De legibus 3.12.27).  
 
As a counterweight to this popularis concession, the laws provide that the 
senate’s decrees shall now be binding (eius decreta rata sunto). This 
combination of authority and accountability, Marcus argues, will allow 
concordia ordinum to be restored: 
 
[F]or the fact is that if the Senate is recognized as the leader of public 
policy, and all the other orders defend its decrees, and are willing to allow the 
highest order to conduct the government by its wisdom, then this 
compromise [ex temperatione iuris], by which supreme power is granted to the 
people and actual authority to the Senate [cum potestas in populo, auctoritas 
in senatu sit], will make possible the maintenance of that balanced and 
harmonious constitution which I have described (De legibus 3.12.28). 
 
A contemporary reader would not fail to notice that under Cicero’s 
“compromise”, Rome’s boni have gained far more, constitutionally speaking, 
than they have given up. Though the majority of Rome’s senators had 
always come as a result of their election to the magistracies, this was even 
more the case given the deterioration in the role of censor by the late 50s44. 
By contrast, eliminating the requirement that assemblies ratify senate 
decrees and delegating the right to appoint dictators would together amount 
to a massive increase in the senate’s legislative power. Where traditionally its 
consulta were directed only at specific magistrates and thus expired at the 
end of that magistrate’s term, here a senate’s decree would have the force of 
lex, that is, a law in perpetuity unless repealed 45 . While the forma and 
                                                        
44 See Lintott, The Constitution of the Roman Republic, cit.: 70, 116. 
45 See Dyck, A Commentary on Cicero, De legibus, cit.: 15; it is unclear whether under 
Cicero’s constitution the popular assemblies would retain the right to veto a senatorial 
decree, even if an assembly was no longer needed to ratify it. 
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lineamenta of Roman institutions remain technically in place, under Cicero’s 
constitution, quite clearly, the senate would rule. 
Cicero’s second innovation is a fixing in place of Rome’s traditionally 
unwritten ladder of office, the cursus honorum. In a provision with 
potentially significant consequences for senate membership, Marcus relegates 
quaestors to the category of minoris magistratus, and sets the position of 
aedile as the “first step in the advancement to higher office” (De legibus 3.3.7). 
Though this new rule, uncommented upon in the dialogue, would arguably 
remove an area of dispute in the interpretation of Roman political custom, 
Rawson notes that Cicero’s senate would be “less representative than ever, as 
many novi homines got to the quaestorship but no further” 46 . Citing 
testimony from Plutarch and Caesar, Rawson posits that this downgrading of 
the quaestorship can be viewed as a response to a rash of cases of financial 
mismanagement – which Cicero, as a former quaestor, would certainly have 
been privy to. If true, Rawson’s observation further supports the notion that 
Cicero was treating his constitutional project seriously, and was molding his 
laws to meet contemporary political concerns. 
A final provision, less an innovation than an aspiration, is that the senate  
 
shall be free from dishonour, and shall be a model for the rest of the 
citizens (De legibus 3.3.10).  
 
When Atticus jokes that the task of punishing all the current senate’s 
misdeeds “would wear out all the judges as well as the censors”, Marcus tells 
him not to worry,  
 
for we are not talking about the present Senate or of the men of our own 
day [qui nunc sunt], but about those of the future [de futuris]; that is, in case 
any of them ever are willing to obey these laws of mine (De legibus 3.13.29).  
 
                                                        
46 Rawson, “The Interpretation of Cicero’s De legibus”: 143. See also Dyck, A Commentary 
on Cicero, De legibus, cit.: 15, the senate would be “a more elite body with the quaestors 
excluded.” One wonders whether this provision is meant to complement the provisions on 
strict senatorial morality discussed at 3.13.30-31; conversely, tightening the cursus 
honorum may have served to inoculate Cicero from the suspicion that his ascendance 
would inspire too many other novi to follow suit. On whether a work of Theophrastus may 
also have inspired this provision, see Rawson, “The Interpretation of Cicero’s De legibus”, 
cit: 143. 
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This sentence, as rendered above by Clinton Keyes, has often been taken 
as further proof that Cicero intended De legibus to be the template for an 
“ideal” Rome, somewhere in the distant future, as opposed to a series of 
practical proposals to fix the problems of his own day. Such an interpretation 
involves two related misreadings of Cicero’s text: that optimus must mean 
“ideal” in the transcendent sense, as opposed to merely “optimal” or “best”, 
as discussed above; and that the nunc and de futuris in the sentence above 
suggest two different epochs of mankind, as opposed to merely “now” and “in 
the future”. Taken in this more straightforward sense, nunc and de futuris 
testify to the simple, and seemingly incontestable, insight that the goal of a 
moral senate would take more than a single generation to achieve. In this, he 
once again draws from Book VI of Plato’s Laws, where the Athenian declares 
that his new constitution will not truly take root until a generation of 
statesmen has been educated in them from childhood47. 
Cicero’s proposals for a stronger and more virtuous senate are consistent, 
needless to say, with a lifetime’s worth of speeches and letters on the subject. 
Here too, however, the metaphor of the painted republic offers insight into 
the purpose Cicero wanted the senate to fulfill. Over the previous 80 years, 
the contest between optimate and popularis had been waged as a proxy battle 
between the relative power of the institutions each side was seen to control. 
To achieve their political ends, the Gracchi were seen as stretching the 
tribunate’s constitutional authority at the senate’s expense; to achieve his 
own political ends, Sulla had enlarged the senate and hobbled the tribunes48. 
Applying the painting metaphor to Cicero’s senate shows how adamantly 
he wanted to break from this zero-sum pattern. Strengthening a single 
institution at the direct expense of another would violate the “configuration” 
handed down by the maiores; Cicero’s laws are designed to be measured not 
by which sector of Roman society gains or loses, but in their level of 
interdependence on one another. The senate of the De legibus is thus designed 
as a microcosm of the whole republic, in which the people participate, power 
is rotated, and the best men rule. For Cicero, fixing the senate is the closest 
                                                        
47 “Now a man need not be very wise, Cleinias, in order to see that no one can easily 
receive laws at their first imposition. But it we could anyhow wait until those who have 
been imbued with them from childhood, and have been nurtured in them, and become 
habituated in them, take their part in the public elections of the state […] then I think 
that there would be very little danger, at the end of the time, of a state thus trained not 
being permanent” (Laws 752c). 
48 See Lintott, The Constitution of the Roman Republic, cit.: 208-11. 
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thing to a constitutional panacea; if a new generation of virtuous men can 
“refresh its colors”, their virtues will resonate up and down the political 
ladder49. This, for Cicero, is the indispensable lesson of Rome’s maiores:  
 
For, if you will turn your thoughts back to our early history, you will see 
that the character of our most prominent men has been reproduced in the 
whole State; whatever change took place in the lives of the prominent men 
has also taken place in the whole people (De legibus 3.14.31). 
 
By making the senate more accountable, more effective, and more 
virtuous, Cicero imagines that all sides to Rome’s civil wars will consider 
themselves the victors.   
 
E. The Censorship 
 
If Cicero had hesitated before in owning up to his constitutional innovations, 
his hesitation ends with the censorship:  
 
The last of my laws have never been in use among us, but are necessary 
for the public interest (Extremae leges sunt nobis non usitatae, rei publicae 
necessariae) (De legibus 3.20.46). 
 
His forthrightness may be explained by the fact that the first role 
assigned to the censors, the clarification and protection of Rome’s laws in 
written form, is so similar to the one Cicero has assigned himself: “We have 
no guardianship of the laws”, Marcus declares,  
 
and therefore they are whatever our clerks want them to be (De legibus 
3.20.46).  
 
For this reason, censors shall in the future “have charge of the official 
text of the laws” (censoris fidem legum custodiunto) (De legibus 3.4.11). Marcus 
                                                        
49 Cf. Cicero’s assertion that Rome’s leading men “do more harm by their bad examples 
than by their sins.” (De legibus 3.14.32) The insight is a convincing one. One wonders, 
though, how convincingly Cicero could defend the example set by the optimate Scipio 
Nasica in 132 in leading a mob to murder the sacrosanct tribune Tiberius Gracchus, the 
inaugural bloodbath of Rome’s civil war. Cicero revises history to blame Gaius Gracchus 
for setting this “example”, 3.9.20-21. 
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explains that here he is adopting the Greek institution of nomophylakes, in 
which censors shall not merely guard the physical text of the laws, “as was 
formerly done at Rome also”, but observe men’s actions as well and recall 
them to obedience to the laws50. To emphasize the critical importance of the 
office, he emphasizes that while all other magistracies will be elected for 
single-year terms, censors shall hold office for five years and their office 
“shall never be vacant”51 (De legibus 3.20.47). To their traditional functions 
of purging the senate rolls, an additional supervisory function is added to the 
censorship:  
 
[M]agistrates, after completing their terms, are to report and explain 
their official acts to these same censors, who are to render a preliminary 
decision in regard to them (De legibus 3.20.47). 
 
After defending their tenure in this fashion, outgoing magistrates remain 
liable nevertheless to prosecution by a private accuser, because  
 
it is unreasonable to expect real severity from accusers unless they act 
voluntarily (De legibus 3.20.47). 
 
Why does Cicero place such importance on an institution that had fallen 
into near-total disuse? Returning again to the painting, the antiquity and 
desuetude of the censorship may have been sufficient qualities in themselves 
to warrant Cicero’s attention; a constitutional painter would naturally give 
special attention to figures that had faded the most. Rawson notes that this 
attention may have been of particular personal importance to Cicero, given 
                                                        
50  Rawson interprets the clerical “guardianship of the laws” as the compilation and 
preservation of hard copies, and not about introducing this practice, which already existed, 
but improving it: “What Cicero is worried about is the copies circulating among the staffs 
of magistrates (compare the books of scc. that apparently existed) […] [This] might not 
only raise the standard of individual behaviour, but avoid some of the controversies as to 
what the law was – one thinks of Appius Claudius and the necessity or otherwise of his lex 
curiata” (Rawson, “The Interpretation of Cicero’s De legibus”, cit.: 147). 
51 The continuous occupancy requirement also finds an antecedent in Book VI of Plato’s 
Laws: “But as a ship sailing on the sea has to be watched night and day, in like manner a 
city also is sailing on a sea of politics, and is liable to all sorts of insidious assaults; and 
therefore from morning to night, and from night to morning, rulers must join hands with 
rulers, and watchers with watchers, receiving and giving up their trust in a perpetual 
succession” (758a). 
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that his personal heroes among the maiores – Cato the Elder, Scipio 
Aemilianus, Scaurus, and L. Crassus – had all served as censors52. More 
interestingly, we see how his attention to the censorship reveals both 
reciprocity and tension between the “lines” and “colors” of his constitution. 
On the one hand, the strengthened censorship shows the supreme importance 
Cicero places on moral correction via institutional control over a magistrate’s 
public and personal lives – through the yearly review of magistrates and the 
power to purge the senate rolls, respectively. The priority given to 
“refreshing the colors” over “preserving the configuration” in the painting 
metaphor may suggest that for Cicero, the loss of virtue was the paramount 
factor in the republic’s present crisis53. On the other hand, his emphasis on 
the censor’s power to control morality points to an ambivalence about what 
good laws can and cannot do to achieve this goal54. The new penalties for 
disobeying augurs or praise for prudent vetoes may orient citizens in the 
right general direction, but in the end only men, men with real power, can 
control other men.  
 
F. Judicial Rights & The Limits of Law 
 
The innovations Cicero offers in the area of judicial rights are largely 
consonant with his other institutional adjustments. His rule against privilegia 
expresses the principle that law be a force binding society together and not 
wielded against a particular individual; having recently been the target of 
Clodius’ privilegium, Cicero could have additionally considered this rule the 
                                                        
52 Rawson, “The Interpretation of Cicero’s De legibus”, cit.: 144, n. 59. 
53 Rawson observes a similar interdependence between these moral functions of the censors 
and their more clerical ones. Noting that the νομοφύλακες corrected both texts and the 
behavior of individuals, she concludes that for Cicero, “these two things are now properly 
comparable” (147). 
54 To Cicero’s credit, the insufficiency of written law to produce moral citizens is one which 
he confronts head-on: “Since, then, we must retain and preserve that constitution of the 
State which Scipio proved to be the best in the six books devoted to the subject, and all 
our laws must be fitted to that type of State, and since we must also inculcate good morals, 
and not prescribe everything in writing, I shall seek the root of Justice in Nature, under 
whose guidance our whole discussion must be conducted” (De legibus 1.6.20). Cicero thus 
brings a statesman’s hard-won skepticism to the Platonic debate over the relationship 
between positive law and moral action, a debate that has dominated the last century of 
legal theory. On other correspondences between De legibus and modern legal theory, see 
Section E, infra. 
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settling of a political score 55 . Cicero also proposes new penalties against 
electoral bribery, for which “the punishment shall fit the offense” 56  (De 
legibus 3.20.46). Lintott both highlights and criticizes Cicero’s originality on 
this point, concluding that this new provision is “at variance with normal 
practice in implying that magistrates should be general law-enforcers, when 
in fact they had neither the time nor the resources so to be”57.  
This attention to both the power and limitations of written law shows a 
final innovation on Cicero’s part, namely that he prefigures in the De 
republica and De legibus several of the principal problems in contemporary 
legal theory: the insufficiency of written law as a spur to moral action 
(discussed in Section E above), the inherent incompleteness of law, and the 
relationship between morality and positive law. In each case, he engages the 
Stoic natural law tradition to explore what a written and prescriptive 
constitution could do to renew the Roman state. 
The incompleteness problem of law stems from the natural, and more 
importantly the temporal, limitations of human reason: even at their most 
rational, human laws are created to be applied to future situations, but can 
only be written based on past experience58. Plato refers to this problem 
directly in the predicament of the constitutional painter, who needs  
 
some one to succeed him who will correct the flaws which time may 
introduce, and be able to add what is left imperfect through the defect of the 
artist (Laws, VI.769c).  
 
While recognizing this inescapable difficulty, Cicero inverts Plato’s 
argument in Rome’s favor: Rome’s constitution is optimus precisely because 
it did not have to rely on a single, all-seeing lawmaker. “There never has 
lived a man possessed of so great genius,” declares Scipio,  
 
                                                        
55 See Dyck, A Commentary on Cicero, De legibus, cit.: 17 for a discussion of whether 
Clodius’s law against Cicero really had been a privilegium, and if so, whether it was 
consonant with existing Roman practice. For a more extended treatment of privilegia by 
Cicero, see De Domo Sua, 17.43-44. 
56 Noxiae poena par esto. 
57 Lintott, The Constitution of the Roman Republic, cit.: 227. 
58 For a compelling recent application of this idea, see K. Pistor and C. Xu, “Incomplete 
Law: A Conceptual and Analytical Framework and its Application to the Evolution of 
Financial Market Regulation”, Journal of International Law and Politics 35(2003), 931-
1013. 
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that nothing could escape him, nor could the combined powers of all the 
men living at one time possibly make all necessary provisions for the future 
without the aid of actual experience and the test of time (De republica 2.1.2).  
 
Cicero’s metaphysical trick is to merge the collective judgments of mortal, 
partially sighted individuals into an immortal, all-encompassing code: the 
mos maiorum and the law of nature as a single force guiding the lawmaker’s 
hand. Thus, the descriptive aspect of Cicero’s laws – the claim that he is 
merely transcribing the semi-divine mos maiorum – camouflages the risk of 
prescriptive innovations that (and one thinks of the ballot law here) could 
fizzle or flop in practice. This is a maneuver attempted by practically every 
republic in modern times – portraying its constitution as both the 
crystallization of time-honored values and the self-contained source of 
legitimacy for future decisions – but Cicero was the first in history to try it. 
A third and final preoccupation of modern legal theory is whether laws 
are laws regardless of their underlying morality (the positivist position) or 
whether conformity with moral principles is part of the very definition of law 
(the natural law position)59. Cicero indicates his affiliation to the latter school 
in the early chapters of Book II, citing Cocles’s bravery on the bridge and the 
wickedness of Tarquin’s rape, actions that required no written law, he asserts, 
to make them good or evil. For even when no written law existed, the 
character Marcus explains,  
 
reason did exist, derived from the Nature of the universe, urging men to 
right conduct and diverting them from wrongdoing, and this reason did not 
first become Law when it was written down, but […] came into existence 
simultaneously with the divine mind (De legibus 2.4.10).  
 
Having recognized the priority of ius natura over written law, Cicero 
decides not to curtail the role of man-made law in his optimus Rome, but 
rather to invent a novel and higher form of it. This new species of Roman law 
would function as a kind of daimon, a mediating force between divine reason 
and imperfect humanity. It would join certain sacred principles – that all 
public commands must be lawful, or that  
                                                        
59 For the classic general treatment of the positivist position, see H. L. A. Hart, The 
Concept of Law, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1961; for a leading contemporary 
exponent of natural law theory, see J. Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights, Oxford, 
Oxford University Press, 1980.  
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he who rules should remember that in a short time he will have to obey 
(De legibus 3.2.5)  
 
– to a reshaped institutional framework which will allow Romans a 
process to create legitimate, prudent, and virtuous laws in the future. The use 
of a single document as a “higher law,” a bridge between divine reason and 
the partisan, inconsistent legislation of real politicians, was something new in 
human history. And as Clinton Keyes so astutely observed, this invention of 
Cicero’s is precisely what the modern world has come to think of as a 
constitution60. 
A final observation is due to the legal protections Cicero provides to 
individual Roman citizens against state power. One such provision is among 
the very first in the code: the provocatio or guaranteed right of judicial appeal 
of a magistrate’s decision “to an equal or higher authority, or the people”61 
(De legibus 3.3.6). A second rule guarantees the citizen’s right to be heard in 
assemblies, privatis magistratibusve audiendis62 (De legibus 3.19.42). This latter 
provision, in turn, is brought into relation with two others: the requirement 
that cases involving the death penalty or the loss of citizenship be tried 
“before the greatest assembly”, and the rule against privilegia, the misuse of 
the legislative process to punish a single citizen. “Nothing could be more 
unjust than such a law”, declares Cicero,  
 
                                                        
60 See Keyes, “Original Elements in Cicero’s Ideal Constitution”, cit.: 309. As always, 
Cicero’s high-mindedness is served with a dose of hard-edged political gamesmanship. 
Natural law theory provides the means to undermine his popularis adversaries by creating 
a new standard for legal legitimacy: Cicero’s law code, which hews to divine reason, is 
“true law,” while the enactments of uneducated crowds “bear the title of laws rather by 
favour than because they are really such.” (De legibus 2.5.11) See also 2.5.13, discussed in 
Section A above, where Marcus sidesteps the problem of denying that certain popularis 
laws were really laws by noting that in any event, “the Senate repealed them in one 
sentence and in a single moment.” 
61 Cicero abridges the right of provocatio for Roman soldiers serving in the field. See De 
legibus 3.3.6. 
62 See Lintott, The Constitution of the Roman Republic, cit.: 40-41: “The word ‘heard’ 
should also be stressed: although other magistrates and private citizens were asked to 
speak by the president of an assembly […] there was no general right to participate in the 
discussion, such as obtained in a Greek democracy like that of Athens”. 
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when the very word ‘law’ implies a decree or command which is binding 
upon all. (De legibus 3.19.44).  
 
Cicero’s attention to the rights of individual citizens lead us to a final and 
perhaps unexpected question. It is conventionally understood that the 
modern “bill of rights”, a series of guarantees protecting individual citizens 
from undue state power, was a creation of the Enlightenment and would 
have been entirely alien to the statesmen of antiquity. In addition to the 
foregoing provisions of De legibus, two passages from Cicero’s De domo sua 
(composed just prior to the De legibus in 57) suggests that it is time to 
reexamine this assumption. Ranting against his exile at the hands of Clodius, 
Cicero asserts  
 
that it was impossible, according to public equity and the constitution 
enjoyed by the state [iure publico, legibus iis], for any citizen, without a trial 
[sine iudicio], to have such disaster inflicted upon him as that in question; 
that this right existed in this state even in the days of the kings, that it has 
been bequeathed to us by our ancestors, and is, finally, the peculiar mark of a 
free community (De domo sua ad pontifices  22.31).  
 
Later in the same speech, he upbraids Clodius for having violated the 
rule that no Roman could have his citizenship rights stripped against his will 
[invitus]: 
 
And is this the right which you, pillar of our democracy [homo popularis], 
think should be the bulwark of our citizenship and our freedom, the right of 
each one of us to lose our franchise, if, when the tribune of the plebs asks, ‘Is 
it your will and command?,’ a hundred men of Fidulius’ stamp say that it is 
their will and command? If this is so, then there was no true democratic spirit 
in our ancestors, who laid down laws of franchise and freedom with the intent 
that neither phases of lawlessness, nor ascendancy of magistrates, nor 
verdicts recorded, nor even the authority of the whole Roman people, 
paramount in all else, should avail to undermine them (De domo sua ad 
pontifices 30.80). 
 
A guaranteed citizen right to trial and appeal. A guaranteed right to be 
heard in public debate. Inalienable rights to citizenship. A compilation of 
these guarantees in a written, prescriptive code of law, with the additional 
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guarantee that they could not be overridden by popular majorities. Was 
Cicero on the verge of drafting a Roman “bill of rights”? At the end of Book 
III, Atticus observes that Marcus has left some unfinished business, 
specifically an explanation of “the law of the Roman people” (de iure populi 
Romani). Atticus specifies that he intends to hear details from Marcus 
concerning the powers of individual magistrates as well as, presumably, the 
limits of those powers (De legibus 3.20.48-49). How far Cicero intended to 
develop the notion of individual rights and constitutional guarantees may 
remain one of the great unsolved mysteries of ancient political thought. 
 
 
Conclusion: Was the De legibus a Failure? 
 
The astonishing range of Cicero’s innovations should not obscure the fact 
that the De legibus, on its own terms, was a failure. Available evidence 
suggests it was neither finished nor published in Cicero’s lifetime63, and it 
certainly did not forestall the collapse of the republic Cicero held dear. Why 
did Cicero’s constitution get such scant attention, from his contemporaries, 
from modern scholarship, and apparently from the author himself64? 
The circumstantial reasons for its incompleteness are easy to discern. 
Cicero was called back into public life in 51, to an apparently undesired 
governorship in Cilicia where he served the republic once again with 
distinction65. By the time of his next authorial otium in the mid-40s, political 
conditions had deteriorated a great deal further: Clodius was dead and buried, 
but Caesar’s consolidation of power had made a pro-republican project on the 
scope of De legibus both riskier and a great deal more futile. Cicero’s personal 
temperament may also have been at play: near the beginning of Book I he 
confesses the ease in which his written work can be derailed 
 
nor do I find it so easy to resume an interrupted task as I do to complete 
at once whatever I have undertaken66 (De legibus 1.3.9). 
                                                        
63 See Rawson, Cicero: A Portrait, cit.: 153. 
64 Zetzel observes, “[A]lone among Cicero’s major philosophical works, it is not mentioned 
a single time in Cicero’s correspondence” (Zetzel (ed. By), Cicero: On the Commonwealth 
and On the Laws, cit.: xxi). 
65 Ibid. at 153, 164-182. 
66 Cf. Zetzel’s view that De legibus’s incompleteness may be a function of its incoherence: 
“Cicero is quite successful in dealing separately with the philosophical underpinnings of 
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What remains to us is incomplete, but as a constitutional artist, Cicero 
has left much upon which to judge him. To his credit, he located the principal 
cause of Rome’s crisis not in the follies of his popularis adversaries, but in the 
moral failings of his optimate allies. His laws aimed not just at correcting and 
educating Rome’s senators, but in creating the institutional framework that 
would demand their best and punish their worst. In a lesson to political 
conservatives ancient and modern, Cicero recognized that preserving the best 
of Rome’s past required creative action in Rome’s present. Not only were 
novi ideas not antithetical to the mos maiorum, they were indispensable to the 
goal of sustaining what the ancestors had built.  
But would Cicero’s constitution have done any good? Though De legibus 
gives warranted attention to some of the glaring faults of late-republican 
politics – chiefly violence, bribery, and corruption – it fails to address some of 
the worst. Cicero’s code provides no antidote to the rise of politician-generals 
whose legions were loyal to them rather than to the state – in fact, by 
suspending provocatio for soldiers and reaffirming the consuls’ sole authority 
in the field, Cicero’s laws might actually have made the problem worse. He 
ignores the proliferation and abuse of veto powers, which together had 
ground the legislative process to a halt – in fact, judging from his 
endorsement of a proto-filibuster at 3.18.40, Cicero was far more interested in 
stopping bad laws than allowing good ones to pass67. Maddeningly true to 
form, Cicero fails to recognize any legitimate grievances of Rome’s citizen 
majority which lay behind the social reforms he so disdained. His 
constitutional innovations flow from a simplistic optimate reading of recent 
history: Rome’s crisis began when the people forgot their place, and the 
senate its virtue. Perhaps most dismaying, besides the preambular principle 
iusta imperia sunto, he fails to engage the most noteworthy issue of his own 
political career, namely, the legal consequences of declaring a state of 
emergency. Given another Catilinarian conspiracy – or a tyrant savvy 
                                                                                                                                                                     
justice and the particularities of legislation but is unable to make the two cohere…There is 
every reason to believe that On the Laws was left incomplete not merely because of the 
turbulent circumstances of Cicero’s life but because it is not nearly so satisfying a work at 
On the Commonwealth” (Zetzel (ed. By), Cicero: On the Commonwealth and On the Laws, cit.: 
xxiii). 
67 “A long speech should never be indulged in unless, in the first place, the Senate is taking 
some mischievous action—which most usually comes about through some illegitimate 
influence—and no magistrate is taking any steps to prevent it, in which case it is a good 
thing to use up the whole day”. 
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enough to invent one – Cicero’s ingenious notion of a higher, unassailable 
code for Rome would inevitably have foundered on the rocks of the senatus 
consultum ultimum. The problems Cicero recognized receive inventive and 
elegant treatment in his code, with a keen awareness of both the utility and 
futility of written law. As for these latter problems: cum tacent, clamant. 
Despite these shortcomings, De legibus remains an enormously important, 
and heretofore undervalued, landmark in constitutional thought. It is the 
valedictory text in an antique tradition dating back through Plato to 
Lycurgus and Solon: the artful arrangement of political power, grounded 
upon the rule of law, to create the good society. Once Cicero put down his pen, 
fifteen centuries would pass before this work began again in earnest. When 
sovereign citizens once more replaced semi-divine monarchs in the West, 
these citizens built their new republics on the idea Cicero had pioneered, that 
a written constitution could frame a new political order while preserving the 
wisdom of ages past. Cicero did not inaugurate this new age, but he did 
provide the lineamenta within which modern constitutionalism was born, and 
for which new republics continue to offer fresh colors. What is more, Cicero 
harnessed the power of metaphor and dialectic to create a constitutional 
poetics whose legacy the modern world has barely understood, and whose 
potential we have not begun to realize. Like the Marian oak Atticus 
recognizes in the work’s opening lines, Cicero’s laws, unfinished and unheeded 
in his own time, were “planted with the imagination”, and like those august 
boughs, “will live in men’s thoughts for a longer time than Nature could have 
kept them in existence”. 
 
 
 
